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I. Introduction
In the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance report, a dispatch designed to
identify the most urgent threats to the United States of America, the Biden administration
highlighted violent extremism as one of the biggest global threats the United States faces stating
“…violent extremism, both domestic and international, remain significant threats” (Biden, 2021).
The use of the term “extremist” and “extremism” have proliferated with the United Nations
releasing a comprehensive strategy to combat what it labeled as “violent extremism” (United
Nations, 2016). The Peoples Republic of China also freely uses this label. On the website for the
Chinese Embassy in the United States, a state press release reads that sections of its population
have founded “religious extremist groups” that launch frequent terrorist attacks (Chinese
Embassy, 2021). A wide range of states and the United Nations itself clearly identify extremists
and the spread of extremism as existential threats to the prosperity, safety, security, and futures of
their peoples and nation.

This raises the question then of how extremism is defined? How does extremism define
itself? In what way does extremism produce and reproduce its own identity? The following essay
explores these questions and offers the foundation to understand extremism-more accurately
defined as “oppositional ideologies”-and the key mechanism that facilitates the function of
oppositional ideologies, that key mechanism being sacrifice. By applying the theoretical
framework of oppositional ideologies and the cultural mechanism of sacrifice in a cross-cultural
comparison of two distinct oppositional ideologies, wahhabism/sala sism and white nationalism,
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I will examine the universal function of sacrifice that lays at the heart of all oppositional
ideologies.
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II. Oppositional Ideologies
Extremism has become a frequently used term despite its meaning not being well
understood as well as the boundaries between extremism and mainstream political theories and
social movements being undefined. This absence of clarity is further confounded by most states
lacking a legal definition of extremism (Bötticher, 2017). Despite this, rhetoric around battling,
countering, and eliminating extremism is widely used by various states and political actors with a
multitude of programs existing to combat the threat of extremism with a focus on “violent
extremism” and “de-radicalization” (Bötticher, 2017). This new use of extremism as an explicit
tool of state power to identify those opposed to its interests is best understood in the theoretical
framework of “biopolitics” set out by Michel Foucault and later expanded by Giorgio Agamben’s
“state of exception” and will be explored shortly. Examining extremism in this way moves the
conversation forward about how to define individuals and beliefs as extremist, why we use these
labels, and eventually offers up a new theoretical conception of “oppositional ideologies.”

The origin of the term “extremism” comes from Bishop Stephen Gardiner who in 1546
used the precursor term of “extremite” to describe his enemies. Joseph Worcester’s dictionary
from 1846 is cited as an early source, but, in an explicitly political context, the terminology of
extremism is rooted in the modern world with US Senator Daniel Webster popularizing it to
describe what he viewed as the most violent proponents of the anti-slavery cause during the
American Civil War (Bötticher, 2017). The terminology of extremism would be revitalized again
in the US during the 1960s while in Germany the modern popularization of the term only entered
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the “Duden” dictionary in 1942. It would be introduced as a scientific concept by Manfred Funke
in the late seventies and gain popularity going into the 1980s as empirical approaches were
developed to offer more concrete conceptualizations of extremism and its function (Bötticher,
2017).

In 1974, the Verfassungsschutz-the German domestic intelligence service-and the Office
for the Protection of the Constitution, introduced the term into the German political sphere using
the term to denote “…a fundamental opposition to core values of the West German constitution”
(Bötticher, 2017). This new categorization made Germany one of the only countries to explicitly
define extremism and was further reflected and enshrined in the German state by a series of
verdicts made by the federal constitutional court to target the Sozialistische Reichspartei
Deutschlands, a successor party of the Hitler-era National Socialists, and the German Communist
party (Bötticher, 2017). Since then, other states have begun to use the terminology of extremism
to persecute “extremists,” perhaps most notably “religious extremists,” during the global war on
terror. Larger conversations about extremism terminology have shifted the discussion away from
why it is used to instead creating theoretical frameworks rooted in empirical and inductive
research (Bötticher, 2017) so that states, academics, and researchers can better define it (Berger,
2018).

Extremism being institutionalized as a tool of the state is a uniquely modern practice that
fits into the larger framework set out in Michel Foucault’s theory of “biopolitics.” Foucault’s
theory of biopolitics presents an analysis and conclusion that the modern state has evolved past
4

historical governance to form a limited range of practices that encompass “religious guidance of
the soul,” defining the religious identity of a population, and to administer on a territory holding
and its inhabitants new forms of governing (Gutting & Oksala, 2018). These new forms mean
governing a population through biological forms of knowledge that include statistical analysis,
bio-scientific knowledge, and macro-economics to control the very life and well wellbeing of its
population (Gutting & Oksala, 2018).

Foucault describes this new governance as “the way in which one conducts the conduct
of men,” (Gutting & Oksala, 2018) using new, most importantly, modern, and complex
“techniques of power” to control every aspect of life experienced by the governed population
(Gutting & Oksala, 2018). To fully understand the methodology for how these modern
techniques of power are enacted, Foucault argues that the underlying rationality of the state must
be understood as these practices of governance are “…enabled, regulated, and justified by a
specific form of reasoning or rationality,” that explain their goals and the methods of achieving
said goals (Gutting & Oksala, 2018).

The most important aspect of Foucault’s theory is understanding power as “a set of
relations,” how these relations are rationalized, how these forms of rationality reproduce
themselves through “systems of practices,” and the role of relations in said systems (Gutting &
Oksala, 2018). The culmination of Foucault’s theory of biopolitics is that the modern biopolitical
governmental rationality encompasses two major features (Gutting & Oksala, 2018). The first is
the consolidation of political power under a centralized state that possesses a highly organized
5

administration and bureaucracy, and the second is “individualizing power” which develops
power technologies aimed at individuals so that the state can govern population conduct in “…a
continuous and permanent way” (Gutting & Oksala, 2018). While all states vary in their ability
to centralize state power and practice individualizing power, it is the goal they practice to
differing degrees (Gutting & Oksala, 2018).

Giorgio Agamben expands on the work of Foucault. While he critiques Foucault’s
specificities regarding biopolitics, Agamben’s “state of exception” fits perfectly into the larger
theoretical framework of biopolitics. Agamben’s critique establishes a connection between
“sovereign power and biopolitics” that a governing body consolidates and exercises its larger
agenda of biopolitics through the sovereign bodies’ practice of power (Lemke, 2005). The power
of the sovereign necessitates the eventual creation of biopolitical strategy as part of a larger wish
to retain sovereignty over its political body (human beings), and the building of biopolitical
regimes is not an upset in state power but instead a continuation of it (Lemke, 2005). An
important part of this biopolitical continuum, and the part of Agamben’s critique that builds on
the work of Foucault without contradicting him, is the concept that this biopolitical society relies
upon the “… simultaneous exclusion of human beings who are denied full legal status” (Lemke,
2005.) This is specifically defined through a “central binary relationship of the political” that
separates “natural being” and the “legal existence” of a person that Agamben asserts is part of all
political processes and creates the space of exception where peoples are removed from their
larger biopolitical body and “… reduced to the status of his physical existence” (Lemke, 2005).
The relation of the state of exception to the larger biopolitical project creates the basis for the
6

political body and helps to further refine the goals and rationalities of the biopoltical project
(Lemke, 2005).

Foucault’s analytical framework, in conjunction with the state of exception from
Agamben’s critique, offers a full understanding of the rise of extremism as a term of political
terminology utilized by the state. In short, extremism is the criterion for the entire basis of the
new regime of biopolitics, and the label of extremism moves people out of the biopolitical
project and into the state of exception. The new biopolitical state “conducts the conduct of men”
through a series of relationships that are being constantly changed and updated, and it is the
relationship between the state and the “extremists” that sets the parameters. Further, this
relationship is a competition of rationalities, the rationality of the state and the rationality of the
extremists. As the rationality of the state adjusts to reject aspects that it once held true, those
aspects of rationality become part of the extreme and exorcised from the curtailed conduct
reinforced by the state. In this way, the state of exception is in constant flux as the state adjusts
and redefines who loses their legal existence and is reduced to their natural being. Moreover, the
state of exception grows not only to encompass a way for the state to define its biopolitical
project through bio-socio ideas but takes on aspects of sociocultural mechanics making culture
itself a biological aspect and creating a blurred realm between bio-socio and socio-cultural
identities blurring.

The relationship of extremism to the biopolitical state is what is used by the biopolitical
state to refine and proliferate its rationale that leads to the creation of these opposition ideologies.
7

They are opposition ideologies because they exist in stark contrast to the biopolitical project
perpetrated by the state. It is the exact way that the state operates the state of exception and
negotiation of its relationship to extremism that is then utilized by those it is being practiced on.
The subjects of these policies use it to further define their own rationale and relationship to the
state observing how they themselves are inscribed into the practices and systems of the state and
working to change these same systems and practices in an effort to alter the overall relationship
between themselves and the state. Specifically, they focus on finding areas where they are able to
upend the centralization of political power to exert their own control, reassert their own
sovereignty on their individualizing power, and form new ways of living. Meaning, these
opposition ideologies formulate and create their own biopolitical projects, developing new vast
states of exception where everyone in the biopolitical project they are opposed to exists in.

Through this built upon analysis, we see that opposition ideologies are biopolitical
projects in their own right, and the main factor that distinguishes them from state sponsored
biopolitical projects is a lack of centralized political power which states use to label anything that
exists beyond the biopolitical project, in the state of exception, as “extremist.” Opposition
ideologies lack the structure and cohesion to enforce their own conceptions of extremism in a
broad spanning political project. It can be observed that these biopolitical projects operate in
conjunction with one another in a constant negation of belonging and dispossession often leading
the boundaries of such projects being blurred as bio-socio and sociocultural identifications and
markers adjust and change. Meaning the state of exception is undergoing constant movement.
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The exact mechanisms of how the biopolitical project is conducted by these opposition
ideologies remain to be explored.

9

III. Sacrifice and Its Mechanics
Hubert and Mauss were some of the first theorists to attempt a definition of the system of
sacrifice, and together they established that the main function of sacrifice was to create a
pathway to link the “sacred” and the “profane” through mediation of a victim (Edwards, 2017).
Through this mediation and the complete destruction of the victim, the relationship between the
profane and the sacred would take on a material form (Edwards, 2017). When a material link is
created between these two spaces, the sacred is given voice and becomes reality (Edwards,
2017). The exact structure of this relationship can be understood as a “tripartite structure” of the
“rite” (act of sacrifice), the “sacri cer” (the actor sponsoring the sacri ce who bene ts from the
sacri ce), and the “victim” (the object destroyed in the act of sacri ce) (Edwards, 2017).

This tripartite structure allows for acts of sacri ce to function across a wide continuum
with “inducing a state of sanctity” on one end and “dispelling a state of sin” on the other
(Edwards, 2017). The ability of sacri ce to encompass such a broad spectrum is because the
perception of the sacri cer allows the conceptions of the sacred and the profane as dichotomous
elements of the same reality that exist as part of a larger sociocultural structure, not forces in
opposition but parts of a larger whole (Edwards, 2017). Hubert’s and Mauss’ de nition of the
system of sacri ce offers an initial jumping off point as they highlight the “reality of violence”
(Edwards, 2017). With this concept of sacri ce, when the victim undergoes consecration, it
undergoes a complete destruction (Edwards, 2017). When the victim is a human being, it is the
destruction of the human being, the “act of killing,” that gives birth to the material form of the
sacred and its relationship to the profane (Edwards, 2017).
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Equally important to understanding the function of sacri ce is the work of René Girard.
Girard put forth the theory of “mimetic desire” as the genesis of all violence (Williams, 1998).
Mimetic desire is the inherent drive in human beings to “…imitate the respected and feared”
(Williams, 1998). This leads to the problem of challenge. That is, if one is able to assert
themselves, they will eventually displace the one they have been imitating, creating a new rival
and leading to an eventual unstable social relations with no means of addressing this
phenomenon (Williams, 1998). Communal order in all forms-language, status, possessions, etc.is threatened through mimetic desire as the rivalry results in violence within the community
(Williams, 1998). Girard explains that the regulatory mechanism to address said phenomenon is
sacri ce through the “scapegoat,” a victim the community nds to hold responsibility for the
problems of rivalry in the community (Williams, 1998).

Sacri ce of the scapegoat allows for the alleviation of violence within the community and
continuing maintenance of the communal order by diverting the violence produced by rivalries in
the community onto the scapegoat and away from community members (Williams, 1998).
During the process of displacement, the intended purpose of alleviating violence within the
community by the enacted violence against the scapegoat is actively concealed by the
community through cultural rationalizations because said community cannot recognize the true
purpose of the scapegoat (Williams, 1998). These cultural rationalizations create symbolic
reasoning that justify the destruction of the scapegoat which, importantly, is marginalized but
still related to the larger community (Williams, 1998). While this will be expanded upon later, it
should be noted that the scapegoat’s marginal, yet still connected, relationship to the community
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is best understood as the scapegoat existing in the state of exception. Oppositional ideologies
exist explicitly in the biopolitical states’s state of exception and act as its scapegoat.

Girard builds on the foundations of mimetic desire by exploring the concepts of violence,
violence’s relationship to the communal order, and sacri ce (Brown, 1977). Violence is the main
form of conduct that humans have used to de ne themselves (Brown, 1977). From violence,
human culture has been formed creating religious and social practices which serve to mitigate
violence by condemning or externalizing it which then serves to deny the relationship between
human beings and violence (Brown, 1977).

Girard develops this conception of violence with the idea of “sacrificial crisis” which is
when a community is in a “crisis of distinctions,” meaning a crisis that affects the cultural
structure of the community, otherwise known as the communal order (Brown, 1977). The
communal order itself is the system that regulates the distinctions in differences between
individuals and is used to establish their identity through their relationship to one another
(Brown, 1977). Thus, the crisis of distinctions is when the rivalries that arise from mimetic desire
come to a head. The sacri cial crisis then occurs when these differences can no longer be clearly
de ned and the mechanism of the scapegoat sacri ce to alleviate violence fails leading to the
proliferation of violence within the community. Sacri ce of the scapegoat must then be
reasserted to ensure the longevity and continued function of the communal order (Brown, 1977).

Sacri ce thus becomes the enabling function that allows for the production and
reproduction of culture, speci cally in a way that the violence enacted through sacri ce is
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controlled through the existing religious and social practices and reinforces the taboos and
prohibitions that serve to mitigate violence in a communal order (Brown, 1977). Violence,
through sacri ce, then can be understood as the way that a community builds identity and orders
itself, albeit in an extremely regulated way, that confers the right to commit violence to the
authorities in said community creating a monopoly on violence.
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IV. Sacrifice As A Tool
The main mechanism that biopolitical projects use to define their own identities is
sacrifice. The function of the state of exception-as all biopolitical projects’ identity is built on its
differences to those not included in the biopolitical project- is sacrifice. The sacred can be
understood as the idealized identity of the biopolitical project while the profane is the opposition
of the idealized identity of the biopolitical project. The range of inducing a state of sanctity and
dispelling a state of sin then becomes a means to encourage behavior that aligns with the
biopolitical project and to discourage behavior that is believed to be in opposition to the
biopolitical project. As Hubert and Mauss explained, sacri ce creates the reality of the sacred
and the profane (Edwards, 2017). It assumes that their reality already exists and through
sacri ce they ful ll the prophecy of the biopolitical project. By proving their rationale and logic
to be already true and making their perceptions of the larger sociocultural structure of the
biopolitical project correct through the action of sacri ce, the profane and sacred come into
cooperation, returning to the state of exception and the biopolitical project working in
conjunction to reinforce their own identities.

Sacri ce then becomes an explicit tool of biopolitical projects in the formation of the
communal order, the structure of the biopolitical project and its idealized identity, and, as stated
by Hubert and Mauss, institutionalizes the reality of violence that is sacri ced as a normalized
part of the biopolitical project. The biopolitical state then further cements sacri ce by exercising
its characteristic centralized power and individualizing power through which it is able to restrict
the act of sacri ce to speci c actors and disallow the practice of sacri ce being put into action by
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unauthorized individuals within the state. This returns to Girard’s original point of sacri ce-the
mitigation of violence in the community and the maintenance of communal order (Williams,
1998). In this way, sacri ce in biopolitical states is used to increase power over the conduct of
the population to ensure that the social practices and cultural institutions that serve to condemn
violence and deny the relationship between human beings and violence play an even greater role,
decreasing the destruction of the human being and the act of killing.

However, the most signi cant way sacri ce mitigates violence is by exporting all
violence that would be caused by rivalries in the biopolitical project to the scapegoat, the
scapegoat in this context being any individual that exists outside of the biopolitical project
meaning anyone that is found in the state of exception. The previously mentioned centralized
power and individualizing of the new biopolitical state allow for the concealment of the violence
being enacted on the scapegoat and the rationalizations justifying violence even more
enforceable. The relationship of the scapegoat existing in the state of exception also serves an
important function of keeping the scapegoat somewhat connected to the larger biopolitical
project allowing the biopolitical state to be continuously negotiating the profane and sacred
within itself and allowing for a exible nature that enables adaptations and changes creating a
resilient and strong communal order.

In this larger framework, one distinction must be made. Within the biopolitical project,
there exist two separate forms: the biopolitical state and the oppositional ideology. While all
biopolitical projects exist in opposition to one another, biopolitical states are characterized by
their possession of centralized power and individualizing power over which they are able to
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exercise greater control and utilization of the mechanic of sacri ce than ever before seen in
human history. Oppositional ideologies lack the centralized power, and, as discussed before, they
are de ned mainly by their opposition to the biopolitical projects of the state, although two
oppositional ideologies can engage in con ict with one another. Returning to the previous
discussion of how biopolitical projects operate in conjunction with one another in a constant
negation of belonging and dispossession through the state of exception, it is sacri ce that de nes
the state of exception, and so, ultimately, it is through sacri ce and de nitions of the sacred and
profane that the biopolitical state and oppositional ideologies negotiate their identities.

Ultimately, the theories on sacri ce established by Hubert, Mauss, and Girard are most
coherently synthesized using David Edwards’ functionalist view of sacri ce (Edwards, 2017).
Edwards uses an analogue that sacri ce is a machine that is reworked, modi ed, and changed
based on the communal order the machinery is being used in. However, the basic components
(the rite, sacri cer, and victim) remain the same as does the purpose of the machine (to produce a
state of sanctity or dispel a state of sin through the the destruction of the scapegoat and through
this process establish one’s own cultural identity and mitigate violence within the communal
order). This essay will demonstrate this position through the exploration of two distinct
applications of sacri ce-mass public shootings and suicide bombings-in two distinct opposition
ideologies-wahhabism/sala sism and white nationalism-in the next sections of the essay.
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V. Suicide Bombings
The term wahhabism refers to a strain of Sunni Islam found mainly in Saudi Arabia and
Qatar that takes its name from Muhammad bin Add al Wahhab, a Muslim theologian from the
eighteenth century Arabian peninsula, whose puritan teachings formed the foundation for
wahhabism (Blanchard, 2008). In the contemporary world, outside Saudi Arabia and Qatar,
wahhabism is used to refer to an interpretation of Sunni Islam that promotes a fundamental
understanding of the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions and advocates the
elimination of any technologies or practices that deviate from this understanding (Blanchard,
2008). It is important to understand that in countries with a predominantly Muslim population
there are Islamists who share a more literal interpretation of the Quran and teachings of the
Prophet Muhammad but refer to themselves as Salafists (Unitarians), and this broader movement
is referred to as “salafisism.” While wahhabism and salafisism both refer to movements that call
for a strict adherence to a conservative teaching and practice of Islam, for the purpose of this
essay, they will be used as two parts of a whole to refer to a larger conception of oppositional
ideologies which both fall into the established definition of oppositional ideologies in this essay.
However, they are distinct, with wahhabism emerging from Saudi Arabia and salafisism serving
as an identifier for more general conservative Islamic movements that have been established
independently at various times in history (Blanchard, 2008).

When discussing advocated violence and perpetuated violence by adherents of
wahhabism and salafisism, it’s important to understand that in the larger religious context of
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Islam that waging violent jihad is not inherent in Islamic beliefs or even in extremely
conservative Islamic beliefs (Blanchard, 2008). Even among practitioners of conservative Islam,
the promotion of violent jihad is a relatively recent occurrence that remains highly disputed even
in wahhabist and salafisist groups (Blanchard, 2008). Scholars date the rise of militancy within
sections of the larger wahhabist and salafisist communities to the 1980s when it emerged as a
form of resistance during the United Soviet Socialist Republics’ occupation of Afghanistan
(Blanchard, 2008). Soviet occupation mobilized thousands of volunteer fighters who were
exposed to new militant forms of wahhabism and salafisism during the conflict (Blanchard,
2008). These ideas further spread through mosques and madrases which were funded by Saudi
Arabian, US, and European foreign aid to support anti-Soviet resistance (Blanchard, 2008).
These networks of militant groups and religious institutions denounced the United States and
Western European countries for imperial practices in the Middle East region along with Saudi
Arabia and Egypt for their support of Western imperialism (Blanchard, 2008). Today, adherents
to wahhabism and salafisism advocate the overthrow of countries in the Middle East region and
the establishment of new states to enforce a conservative interpretation of Islam and the removal
of the US and Western European countries from the region (Blanchard, 2008).

From this historical context, it can be understood that wahhabism/salafisism, not
endorsed by a state, is an oppositional ideology built in direct opposition to the larger cultural
imperial biopolitical entity, first of the Soviet Union and now the “West,” meaning the secular,
western-liberal democratic international project that’s promoted and built by the US and Western
Europe. The exact sacrifice mechanic within the wahhabist and salafisist biopolitical project that
18

I will set out to explore is suicide bombing. Osama Bin Laden was the first wahhabist/salafisist
to promote suicide bombing as the basis of an explicit strategy which he framed as “martyrdom
operations against the enemy” (Edwards, 2017). In the year after Bin Laden released his video
that first introduced the concept of “martyrdom operations” (suicide bombings), only two suicide
bombings occurred, but, in the following years, an average of one hundred suicide bombing
attacks associated with wahhabism/salafisism occurred per year (Edwards, 2017).

Suicide bombings have since become a simple but deadly strategy amongst militant
wahhabists/salafisists in pursuit of larger defense of the sacred values and practices of
conservative Islam that exist in opposition to the biopolitical project of the greater westernliberal democratic international biopolitical project, and its state allies, and resistance to said
biopolitical project, supersede traditional taboos in Islam related to suicide (Hutchins, 2017).
Tala Assad, a researcher on suicide bombings, found increases in jihadism sectarian killings were
closely connected (targeting/in reaction to) with US international interests in the Middle East
region which touches on the important fact that biopolitical projects are both material and
cultural (Mahmood, 2008). To further compound this, Asad argues that acts of violence and
suicide bombers fit into the broader “…western tradition of armed conflict in defense of a free
political community” and are byproducts of the modern nation state and secular liberalism
(Mahmood, 2008). Meaning, the act of scapegoating by the western-liberal democratic
international project that results in the planned killings of civilians fits into the theoretical
context of the biopoltical state in conflict with the oppositional ideology specifically in that both
are equal expressions of these forces scapegoating those in their states of exception and
19

exercising violence to produce a sacrificial act. Both the biopolitical state and oppositional
ideology utilize the scapegoat and enact sacrificial acts of violence that target those who exist in
their respective states of exception.

Suicide bombing is therefore functionally the same as the "legalized violence” sacrificial
practices perpetuated by biopolitical states (Mahmood, 2008). However, suicide bombing differs
from the sacrificial practices of the biopolitical state. During the act of sacrifice-the suicide
bombing, the martyr willingly becomes the agent of his own demise and is consumed by the
sacrifice (Edwards, 2017). In this process, the martyr committing the act takes on the roles of
both the victim and the sacrificer through this process but does not take on the role of the
scapegoat, when viewed in the tripartite structure set out by Hubert and Mauss (Edwards, 2017).
The martyr instead takes on the role of the idealized identity of the biopolitical project, meaning
that by becoming part of the sacrifice and inducing a state of sanctity for themselves and
accruing for themselves and the parties they represent, the status of “the sacred,” and not only the
sacred but the perfect form of the sacred in accordance with their own conception (Edwards,
2017). In shor,t through sacri ce of themselves, they become the idealized form of the sacred in
their biopolitical project which is the idealized identity in said biopolitical project. In this way,
the purpose of sacri ce, to produce and reproduce identity, becomes an even more direct act as
adherents within the oppositional ideology work to re ne it along their individualized conception
of the communal order. The exact factors for this greater role in articulating the identity of the
biopolitical, speci cally in oppositional ideologies, will be explored in a later section.
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VI. Mass Public Shootings
White nationalism in the United Sates advocates for the creation of a state based on white
supremacist ideology which embraces the belief that the white race ranks above all other races
(CRS Report Researchers, 2017). White nationalists operate using a variety of both legal and
illegal activities with developed organizational structures that encompass a wide range of groups
such as the Ku Klux Klan, racist skinheads, Neo-Nazis and Christian identitarians (CRS Report
Researchers, 2017). The ideology of white nationalists divides the world between the white race
and all other races where there exists an existential threat to the white race with particular
animosity directed to both African Americans and, particularly, Jews whom they believe control
the government and orchestrated the civil rights movement (CRS Report Researchers, 2017).
Contemporary white nationalists believe that the current US state discriminates against whites
and that they have “…lost ground to other groups [races]” (CRS Report Researchers, 2017).

White nationalists aim to remedy this perceived loss by creating a society built on racial
separation for which “…extreme measures are required” (CRS Report Researchers, 2017).
White nationalism can most accurately be summarized in the “Fourteen Words” written by David
Lane, a member of a violent white nationalist group during the 1980s, that reads “We must
secure the existence of our race and a future for white children,” and remains “the most popular
white supremacist slogan in the world” (CRS Report Researchers, 2017). In white nationalism,
we nd a case of a biological project where biological “whiteness” is an essential aspect of its
idealized identity (CRS Report Researchers, 2017). The constant negotiation and adaptability of
a biopolitical project is observable as important leaders within white nationalism have rede ned
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whiteness, expanding it beyond the “Aryan” de nition supported by Adolph Hitler and Nazi
Germany which contemporary Neo-Nazism (a section of white nationalism) follows, to include
peoples of Southern and Eastern European descent (CRS Report Researchers, 2017).

Beyond the explicit biopolitical project of the white race’s self-proclaimed biological
superiority, white nationalism is shaped by two major concepts: that violent confrontation with
non-white nationalists is inevitable and that these enemies are part of a larger conspiracy that
controls the existing power structures (CRS Report Researchers, 2017). White nationalists
“commonly anticipate” inevitable con ict in the theory of “racial holy war” that states whites
must wage war against non-whites (CRS Report Researchers, 2017). The reasoning of a racial
holy war stems from the acceptance of conspiracy theories that promote that the history of the
world has been planned by “…vast, long-term, secret conspiracies” that, as previously discussed,
work to control the United States government and establish a “new world order” that will further
disenfranchise whites (CRS Report Researchers, 2017). Speci cally, a Zionist conspiracy called
the Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG) has in ltrated the federal government and works to
further “international Jewish interests” (CRS Report Researchers, 2017). This underlying cultural
conception demonstrates how white nationalism is directly constructed as an oppositional
ideology to the multiracial biopolitical project of the American state, due to the American state
articulating this multiracial biopolitical project, that has taken root and evolved over time. Within
white nationalism, this distinct structuring has led to using labels of the profane and sacred and
created distinct targets for sacri cial violence.
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White nationalists have developed a speci c form of sacri ce-mass public shootings that,
from the mid-1960s, have become exponentially more fatal with white nationalism being linked
to some of the deadliest “… active-shooter episodes in the United States in recent years”
(Ashwal, 2021). Mass public shootings are de ned as “an individual actively engaged in killing
or attempting to kill people in a populated area” that results in “three or more individuals being
killed” (Ashwal, 2021). These mass public shooters have clearly and coherently expressed their
white nationalist views in a series of manifestos that accompanied their attacks that de ne
themselves in contrast to the American state (Ashwal, 2021). This is a component of the effort
by public mass shooters to link themselves to the larger oppositional ideology of white
nationalism and ensure that there is no confusion regarding their motivations, in short making
sure that their sacri cial act is not misinterpreted (Ashwal, 2021).

The mechanics of sacri ce again are well understood by adherents in this oppositional
ideology. Adherents to white nationalism experience a signi cant sense of commitment to the
cause (Ashwal, 2021) with their participation in the act of sacri ce and creation of a communal
order a recognized part of their larger role in a biopolitical project. With the identity and creation
of the sacred and profane and, similar to suicide bombing, the perpetrator taking on the idealized
identity of the biopolitical project of nationalism by making themselves part of the sacri ce, the
criteria of a biopolitical project is clearly met. It is reached with criteria which they themselves
set out. Mass public shooters who belong to white nationalism conceptualize the killing of nonwhites and the enemies of white nationalism as an act to prevent the white race from being
further disenfranchised (Ashwal, 2021). Through this process of the sacredness of the white race
and the idealized white nationalist being established, the idea of someone willing to kill to
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protect the white race is created and reinforced. The subsequent identi cation of the profanenon-whites and the enemies of white nationalism-is achieved through the destruction of said nonwhites, their deaths. Through their destruction, they are established as the object of sacri ce
through which con ict within the white nationalist biopolitical project can be mitigated.

This same function occurs in suicide bombings where the act of sacri ce takes a dualistic
role of de ning the profane and sacred in a single act, most crucial through the consumption of
the sacri cer during the sacri ce. While the consumption of the sacri cer is clear during a
suicide bombing as the perpetrator is literally consumed through the act of using their body as a
vehicle for an explosive device, the sacri ce of the sacri cer in a public mass shooting is less
explicit and relates to the nature of an oppositional ideology. As previously described,
oppositional ideologies exist in the context of a biopolitical state attempting to expand its own
biopolitical project using its unique tools of a centralized state authority and individualizing
power, both tools of power that oppositional ideologies don’t possess, that the biopolitical state
uses to exercise its own sacri cial acts through legalized state violence. White nationalists
understand this and express it through the idea of a state run by “Jews and race traitors” and
know when they carry out mass public shootings that they are going giving themselves up to the
state. They are actively moving themselves to the state of exception as de ned by the biopolitical
state they exist in opposition to, either through “suicide by cop” (legalized violence of the state),
life imprisonment (sacri ce of their personal autonomy to a form of total individualizing
power), or direct suicide (recognizing they will be treated to the rst two forms of sacri ce and
so assert their biopolitical sovereignty) and no matter the outcome will be sacri cing themselves.
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VII. Sacrifice Defined Through Profession
One of the most important aspects of sacrifice to understand is that the proponents and
members of a biopolitical project are cognizant of the function of sacrifice. Meaning, those who
become sacrificers understand that through sacrifice they are able to define the sacred and the
profane and through these definitions are able to produce and reproduce the identity of the
communal authority. In turn, they become part of the greater negotiation that takes place
between biopolitical projects and help to sustain their biopolitical project by constantly adapting
it to an always changing world. It is through this process that wahhabism/sala sism began to
modify itself and was able to transition the identity of the enemy from the Soviet Union to the
United States and likewise how white nationalism was able to integrate southern and eastern
Europeans into the greater project of whiteness.

The underlying factors driving these changes are not the subject of this section. Neither
is the Soviet Union ending its occupation, the United States entering the Middle East Region, nor
the traditional “Aryan” race becoming more integrated with southern and eastern Europeans
during the 1950s further blurring conceptions of whiteness. Rather, the focus is the ability of the
actors in these biopolitical projects, speci cally the oppositional ideologies of wahhabism/
sala sism and white nationalism, to be cognizant of the function of the sacri cial act (mass
public shootings and suicide bombings) and to actively articulate their speci c visions of the
sacred and profane of their oppositional ideology. This articulation is coherent and clear and, as
will be seen, promotes an underlying broader goal that the act of sacri ce helps to achieve.
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On December 30, 2009, Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, a thirty-six year old doctor
form Zarqa, Jordan (also known by his alias Abu Dujaanah al-Khorasani) entered Camp
Chapman, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) forward operating base on the Afghan-Pakistan
border, and detonated an explosive device attached to his person that killed himself, seven
employees of the CIA, and a Jordanian intelligence officer as well injuring six additional persons
(Warrick, 2011). Al-Balawi had been an “online jihadi” posting on online jihadist forums and
slowly rising up the ranks of the online community under his alias al-Khorasani. He claimed to
have fought in Afghanistan and encouraged others to travel abroad and engage in violent jihad
(Jones, 2010). His online activities were discovered by Jordanian intelligence who recruited alBalawi to act as a spy to support US and Jordanian intelligence operations that targeted al-Qaeda
(Jones, 2010). It was for this reason that al-Balawi was invited to Camp Chapman and able to
gain access to CIA of cers (Jones, 2010). Following this attack, the As-Sahab Media
Foundation, Al-Qaida's media wing, released a video interview titled “An Interview With The
Shaheed Abu Dujaanah al-Khorasani” that showed an As-Sahab media person interviewing alBalawi about his upcoming “Martyrdom Operation” (suicide bombing) and was later transcribed
by the CIA’s NEFA Foundation (NEFA Foundation, 2010).

In the opening of the video, the As-Sahab presenter reads out a prepared statement that
clearly de nes the greater con ict of the wahhabist/sala sist oppositional ideology, from AlQaida’s perspective, citing the “second decade” of “The New Crusades” where a “battle between
truth and falsehood” is fought between “the in del West” and “apostate agents in our [AlQaida’s] Islamic region (NEFA Foundation, 2010). The west is led by “the empire of evil and
criminality [America]” which has perpetrated “forms of lowliness, bestiality, and savagery” such
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as “the Gaza Holocaust” and the killing of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, a senior Al-Qaida leader
(NEFA Foundation, 2010). Al-Balawi himself reinforced these themes later in the interview
when he was asked by the As-Sahab presenter what his reasons for embarking on a mission of
violent jihad, and he replied by citing events in Gaza he viewed on the Al-Jazeera news channel
and describing Israeli citizens “… were watching Gaza as it was being bombed by F-16 ghter
jets” and that they watched “… as if they were just observing some natural phenomenon, or as if
they were watching a theatrical lm or something similar” (NEFA Foundation, 2010). Here we
see the construction of Al-Balawi’s conception of the oppositional ideology creating the
boundaries and state of exception, for the biopolitical project with the west and its allies residing
outside of it and the larger Muslim world, the umma, and, speci cally, the peoples of the Middle
East region as existing outside of it through setting out victims (Gaza bombing victims) and
perpetrators (F-16 ghter jets and Israeli citizens).

Al-Balawi further expands on these distinctions by articulating the destruction of the
profane (the west and allies) through the sacri cial act (suicide bombing) that de nes the sacred/
idealized identity within the biopolitical project. Al-Balawi, as a martyr, is willing to give his life
for the furthering of the oppositional ideology’s goals through the sacred’s own destruction that
speak to a greater effort at shaping the identity of the wahhabist/sala sist oppositional ideology.
When asked why a “a martyrdom action” (suicide bombing) was chosen as a strategy, he replied
“This is a blessing which Allah has sent me… that I be given the opportunity to have my severed
limbs be turned into shrapnel, to have my bones be turned into shrapnel, to have my teeth be
turned into shrapnel which will kill these American and Jordanian in dels from the intelligence
apparatuses. How could I possibly refuse?!” (NEFA Foundation, 2010). According to Al-Balawi,
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this is part of a larger message that needs to be sent “…when they think that this man is a spy,
but then this man turns into a bomb, turns into a missile, turns into an explosive, this weakens the
enemy’s resolve and makes him understand that the sons of this religion have never bargained
and will never bargain over this religion, and that this religion is more precious than everything
they own” (NEFA Foundation, 2010). This is the larger goal that this section of the biopolitical
project of the oppositional ideology is arguing for.

On June 17, 2015, Dylann Roof, a twenty-one year old unemployed man, entered the
Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in his hometown of Charleston, South Carolina
and after sitting with worshippers and attending a bible study for at least an hour (Alcindor &
Stanglin, 2015) then took out a .45-caliber handgun hidden under a fanny pack and opened re
with it on the congregation, killing nine African American attendees (Ashwal, 2021). After Roof
completed the mass public shooting, he allegedly "uttered a racially inflammatory statement” to
one of the surviving witnesses so that they could later relay his message (Alcindor & Stanglin,
2015).
Roof’s original plan was to commit suicide with the weapon he used to carry out the mass
public shooting, but, upon realizing he had run out of ammunition, he ed the church and was
later arrested by state law enforcement (Ashwal, 2021). Roof would later tell law enforcement
that he expected to be caught in Charleston and had been traveling to Nashville before his
capture (Alcindor & Stanglin, 2015). Before he committed the mass public shooting, Roof
released a manifesto that highlighted his motives for carrying out the shooting and explained his
hatred for black people on his website titled “The Last Rhodesian” (Ashwal, 2021). The website
title was a reference to the former Republic of Rhodesia, now the country of Zimbabwe in
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southern Africa, in which a bush war was fought from 1965 to 1979 by white settlers to establish
a white separatist state (Siegel, 2015). Beyond his manifesto, the website included photos of
Roof posing with pictures of the Confederate ag and weapons some of which featured the
phrase “1488” which is a reference to David Lane’s “Fourteen Words” and the Neo-Nazi “88”
that translates to “HH,” “Heil Hitler” (Neuman, 2015). These cultural symbols clearly mark
Roof as an adherent to the oppositional ideology of white nationalism and proponent of its
biopolitical project.

Roof's manifesto’s main focus is on the distinction that he draws between the profane and
the sacred. The majority of it is an explanation of who exists in the state of exception and his
personal conceptualization of the con ict between the two. The overarching idea Roof presents is
that the black population of the United States has been habitually attacking the white population
which has no one to “protect it” (Ashwal, 2021). Roof labels the start of his “racial awakening”
after rst hearing about the killing of Trayvon Martin that led to further research of “black on
white crime” in the United States and gave rise to his belief that the white race must be
“defended” (Ashwal, 2021). Roof names the Council of Conservative Citizens as his point of
entry that showed “brutal black on White murders” and made Roof question how the American
news could be “blowing up the Trayvon Martin” while “hundreds of these black on White
murders got ignored” (Roof, 2015).

The next section of Roof’s manifesto names races in the United States and then outlines
race-by-race his views on their role in the United States and their threat to the white race. Roof
labels African Americans as “the biggest problem for Americans,” Hispanics as a “a huge
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problem for Americans,” that Jews “are white” but America must “destroy the jewish identity,”
and the East Asian races as “potential allies” due to their “natural racism” (Roof, 2015). Here
again, the explicitly biological framework of the white nationalist biopolitical project is shown,
making whiteness sacred and non-whiteness profane. The most profane, according to Roof, is
blackness and takes up the largest part of Roof’s explanation of races. However, Roof also
highlights the adversarial nature of the relationship between the oppositional ideology and the
biopolitical state which defines the oppositional ideology as he writes in his section of patriotism
“I hate the sight of the American flag. Modern American patriotism is an absolute joke. People
pretending like they have something to be proud while White people are being murdered daily in
the streets” (Roof, 2015). This further reinforces the status of white nationalism as not only a
biopolitical project but also as an oppositional ideology.

Just as with al-Balawi, we see how Roof expands on these distinctions of whiteness and
non-whiteness by articulating the destruction of the profane (non-whites, specifically African
Americans) through the the sacrificial act (public mass shooting) that also defines the sacred/
idealized identity within the biopolitical project. Roof, a white nationalist willing to give his life
for the advancement of the oppositional ideology’s goals through the sacred’s own destruction,
directly communicates this when quoting his favorite film “Even if my life is worth less than a
speck of dirt, I want to use it for the good of society,” and states “I have no choice. I am not in
the position to, alone, go into the ghetto and fight” (Roof, 2015). Again, just as with al-Balawi,
Roof seeks to advance an underlying broader goal that his sacri cial act will achieve which is to
inspire others to take up “the direct defense of whites in America,” As Roof writes “We have no
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skinheads, no real KKK, no one doing anything but talking on the internet. Well someone has to
have the bravery to take it to the real world, and I guess that has to be me” (Roof, 2015).
According to Dylan’s individual conception of white nationalism, this is what its ultimate
mission should be, and what all in the oppositional ideology of white nationalism should adhere
to.
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VIII. Authority Through Sacrifice
A summation of the established theory up to this point needs to be articulated before the
essay proceeds. To begin, biopolitical projects operate in conjunction with one another in a
constant negation of belonging and dispossession that results in the state of exception being in
continual flux. Opposition ideologies are biopolitical projects in their own right, and the defining
factor that distinguishes them from a biopolitical state is a lack of centralized political power.
Sacri ce mitigates violence by exporting all violence to the scapegoat with the scapegoat de ned
as being any individual that exists outside of the biopolitical project in the state of exception.
Sacri ce de nes who is and isn't part of the biopolitical project and, as stated before, is in
constant ux. Sacri ce can then be understood as the enabling function that allows for the
production and reproduction of culture through violence. It is through this regulated violence that
a community constructs its identity and orders itself. In a community, the central authority holds
a monopoly on violence. Sacri ce then becomes an explicit tool of biopolitical projects in the
formation of the sacred (idealized identity of the biopolitical project) and profane (the antithesis
of idealized identity).

However, as previously stated, opposition ideologies lack a centralized political power,
and so there is no central authority to hold a monopoly on the violence that results from
sacri cial acts. As a result, the original purpose of sacri ce-to mitigate con ict within the
community and uphold a communal order-comes under threat as different factions, groups, and
individuals can assert their own vision of the biopolitical project within the oppositional
ideology. This is seen both in wahhabist/sala sist and white nationalism as you have groups such
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as the Islamic State, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda all coming into con ict with one another as they
argue de nitions of wahhabism/sala sism (Cordesman, 2016) and Neo-Nazis, skinheads,
Christian identitarians, and other white nationalist groups denouncing one another and arguing
over whiteness (Perliger, 2012).

As a response to this lack of a centrally enforced communal order that holds a monopoly
on sacri ce and the ensuing violence, oppositional ideologies have been forced to develop new
cultural technologies of sacri ce. Speci cally, this means using the act of sacri ce to assert their
own authority within the communal order and their vision/conception of the larger biopolitical
project. The proponents and members of an oppositional ideology’s biopolitical project are
cognizant of the role and function of sacri ce, and they understand that it through the act of
sacri ce that de nitions of the sacred and the profane are developed. They then set forth their
de nition of the sacred, the idealized identity with the biopolitical project, and their de nition of
the profane which are completed when both the sacred and profane are consumed (destroyed) by
the sacri cial act. The dualistic role of de ning the profane and sacred in a single act is an
innovation itself that is again made both possible and necessary by the lack of a central authority.
The end result is these actors can utilize sacri ce to produce and reproduce the identity of the
biopolitical project in accordance with their own beliefs through an act that is arti cial in
conception and then becomes authentic through action.

This is the reason that the act of sacri ce is so clearly articulated through messages from
the authors as in the case al-Balawi and his interview with As-Sahab media as well as the case of
Roof making sure he posted his personal manifesto on his website. As seen in the textual
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analysis, both al-Balawi and Roof were careful to de ne the sacred and profane in the context of
their biopolitical projects and set forth a larger goal/mission that they believe is the purpose of
their entire biopolitical project. With regard to oppositional ideology, al-Balawi’s is that a
wahhabist/sala sist conception of Islam will reign over any material reality, and Roof’s is that
the defense of the white race is the top priority. Both agree that these goals superseded their own
lives and the lives of anyone person in their community. This innovative cultural technology then
results in a communal order that does not need to be enforced by a centralized authority and
mitigates con ict within a community to some degree and ensures that it will be able to sustain
itself and continue to adapt to an ever changing world.

fi

fi

fl

34

IX. Conclusion
This essay has answered the questions set forth at its beginning. Through the
establishment of the Foucault & Agamben inspired biopolitical framework of the continuous
negotiation/con ict between the biopolitical state and the oppositional ideology in conjunction
with the theoretical conception of sacri ce begun by Hubert and Mauss and later developed by
Girard, the following has been established. Sacri ce (the sacri cial act) is the mechanism in
which communal order is maintained and with the development of biopolitics has become the
way in which biopolitical projects adapt themselves through the production of reproduction of
culture that most importantly de nes who is a part of the biopolitical project (the sacred) and
who is not part of the biopolitical project (the profane and larger conception of the state of
exception). Both oppositional ideologies and biopolitical states engage in this activity, but
oppositional ideologies lack a centralized authority to enforce a singular conception of the sacred
and profane. As such, multiple sections of one oppositional ideology enter into con ict to de ne
the sacred and profane (the larger boundaries of the biopolitical project and its relationship to the
state of exception) threatening the communal order and further necessitating the need for the
mechanism of sacri ce to mitigate con ict with the community (biopolitical project). As such,
oppositional ideologies further develop sacri ce to assert their own authority in the biopolitical
project and de ne it according to their conception of the biopolitical project. This is the purpose
of sacri ce-to set boundaries and de ne the other according to one’s own constructions of the
biopolitical project so the other can then become a scapegoat that may be sacri ced to mitigate
con ict within the community. Out of necessity, oppositional ideologies have developed to de ne
both the sacred and profane in one sacri cial act.
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